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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This is an appeal from a final Judgment and Decree of Divorce entered by
the Eighth Judicial District Court - Roosevelt Department by District Judge John
R. Anderson. A Motion for New Trial was filed and all post-trial motions have
been denied. Jurisdiction for the appeal is based upon Rule 3 of The Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure and Utah Code Annotated § 78A-(4)-103(h) which provides for
appeals from the District Court involving domestic relations cases to the Utah
Court of Appeals.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1. THE ADOPTION OF THE JUDGE BY SIGNING WITHOUT
CHANGING THE FINDINGS DRAFTED BY PETITIONER'S COUNSEL
REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL.
a. The applicable standard of appellate review, with supporting authority:
The issue of constitutionality presents a question of law, to be reviewed for
correctness and with no particular deference. City ofMonticello v. Christensen,
788 P.2d 513, (Utah 1990). Buck v. Robinson, 2008 UT App 28 If 4, 177 P.3d 648.
The failure of the trial court to make findings material issues is reversible error
Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983). The findings of fact must show
that the trial court's judgment or decree "follows logically from, and is supported
by, the evidence." Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986). The findings
should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the
steps by which the ultimate Conclusion on each factual issue was reached.
Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988)
b. Citation to record showing issues preserved in Trial Court:
The Respondent filed a Motion for New Trial and supporting documents (R.474 478)(Addendum, pg. 57-103). A hearing was held on September 25, 2008 and a
transcript of the hearing is set forth in the Addendum at page 143.

1

2. THE COURT ERRED IN ADOPTING FINDINGS OF FACT AS TO
WAIVER OF THE PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT AND THE COURT
SHOULD HAVE GRANTED A NEW AFTER THERE WAS A TOTAL
ADOPTION OF PROPOSED FINDINGS DRAFTED BY THE
PETITIONER'S COUNSEL
a. The applicable standard of appellate review, with supporting authority:
Peirce v. Peirce, 2000 UT 7, ^{18, A trial court's interpretation of a
prenuptial agreement is reviewed for correctness, according no deference to the
court's conclusions of law. Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co.,
749 P.2d 651, (Utah 1988) "Questions of contract interpretation not requiring
resort to extrinsic evidence are matters of law, and on such questions we accord
the trial court's interpretation no presumption of correctness." at 653.
b. Citation to record showing issues preserved in Trial Court:
The Respondent filed a Motion for New Trial and supporting documents
(R.474 -478)(Addendum, pg. 57-103). A hearing was held on September 25, 2008
and a transcript of the hearing is set forth in the Addendum at page 143.

3. THE DECREE OF DIVORCE AWARDS TO THE PETITIONER
SUBSTANTIAL PRE-MARITAL, SEPARATE PROPERTY AND A NEW
TRIAL SHOULD BE AWARDED. KATHRYN BROUGH FAILED TO
PROVE ANY CO-MINGLING OF SEPARATE PROPERTY OF THE
BUSINESS.
a. The applicable standard of appellate review, with supporting authority:
A trial court's property division determination in a divorce action will be
reversed if there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in
substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated against the
findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of
discretion. Leppert v. Leppert, 2009 UT App 10,1f 9 200 P.3d 223. If the district
court's division determinations do not explain either the factual basis or legal
analysis supporting its determinations and do not provide the appellate court with
enough information to allow meaningful review, the court must reverse and
remand for more detailed findings. Leppert v. Leppert, 2009 UT App 10, ^ 9 200
2

P.3d 223. The property division "must be based upon adequate factual findings
and must be in accordance with the standards set by this state's appellate courts."
Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990). In dividing property in divorce
cases, "the [trial] court must identify the property in dispute and determine
whether each item is marital or separate property." Stonehocker v. Stonehocker,
2008 UT App, % 13 176 P.3d 476. To withstand appellate review, "[t]he [trial
court's] findings of fact must show that the court's judgment or decree follows
logically from, and is supported by, the evidence. The findings should be
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached." Gardner v.
Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, (Utah 1988)
b. Citation to record showing issues preserved in Trial Court:
The Respondent, Mr. Brough, filed Proposed Findings of Fact and a
Memorandum prior to the adoption of the Petitioner's Findings of Fact.
(Addendum, pg. 173) The Respondent filed a Motion for New Trial and
supporting documents (R.474 -478)(Addendum, pg. 57-103).

4. THE DECREE OF DIVORCE UNFAIRLY AWARDS THE
PETITIONER IN EXCESS OF IN LEGAL FEES AND COSTS.
a. The applicable standard of appellate review, with supporting authority:
In a divorce matter the decision to award attorney fees and the amount of
such fees are within the trial court's sound discretion. Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438
(Utah 1978). The trial court's award or denial of attorney fees must be based on
evidence of the financial need of the receiving spouse, the ability of the other
spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees. Oliekan v. Oliekan,
2006 UT, 147P.3d464.
b. Citation to record showing issues preserved in Trial Court:
The Respondent, Mr. Brough, filed Proposed Findings of Fact prior to the
adoption of the Petitioner's Findings of Fact. (Addendum, pg. 178) The
Respondent filed a Motion for New Trial and supporting documents (R.474 478)(Addendum, pg. 57-103).

CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
(SEE ADDENDUM)

3

STATEMENT OF CASE

On October 13, 2005 the matter came before the Court concerning a request
for temporary alimony. At that time, Mary Ann Hansen, Attorney at Law,
represented the Respondent. (R. 600, pg. 3) At the hearing the Court ordered Mr.
Brough to continue to pay the vehicle payment on the truck of the Petitioner and to
pay her $500.00 per month temporary alimony. (R. 600, pg. 18)
This is a Divorce matter that went to bench trial on July 9, 2008. After the
trial, the court asked the Attorney for the Respondent to prepare a partial Decree
of Divorce and Findings of Fact. That Decree divorcing the marriage was not
entered until the hearing on the Motion for New Trial on September 25, 2008.
(Addendum, pg. 208) The Court made no ruling from the bench and did not issue
a written decision. The Court signed without changing the proposed Findings and
supplemental partial Decree submitted by the Attorney for the Petitioner.
(Addendum, pg. 01) A Motion for New Trial was heard on September 25, 2009
and denied. This appeal was filed within thirty days of the entry of the Decree
dissolving the marriage on September 25, 2008 and the denial of the Motion for
New Trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. Kathryn C. Brough and Richard J. Brough were married on July 14, 1998
and they separated seven years later on August 30, 2005 in Roosevelt, Utah.
4

2. The Petition for Divorce was filed on August 30, 2005 by Kathryn
Brough by Clark Allred, Allred & McClellan, P.C.
3. After the Divorce Petition was filed there was an order of temporary
alimony. Prior to trial Mrs. Brough acknowledged that she was co-habitating with
another individual. Alimony was voluntarily terminated and alimony was not an
issue at the trial.
4. Kathryn Brough had three children, all of age from other relationships.
(R.598, pg. 8) Kathryn Brough met Richard Brough when she was with her fourth
husband in 1993 at bar. (R. 598, pg. 9) Around the time Mr. Brough had built a
new shop in Roosevelt, Utah the Petitioner contacted the Respondent concerning
employment again. The Respondent indicated that the business had a secretary
and bookkeeper. The Petitioner has hired to work in cleaning, constructing and
helping to build and organize the shop, as well as other maintenance and cleaning
projects at the business at an hourly rate of employment. (R. 598, pg. 150) Kathryn
Brough and Richard Brough lived together from December 1, 1997 until the
marriage in 1999. (R. 598, pg. 11)
5. When she first married Mr. Brough, Kathryn Brough did not have a
vehicle and only an interest in a residence which was pending in relation to
divorce proceeding with her fourth husband. (R. 598, pg. 63)
6. Mr. Brough has a high school education and after serving time in the
Marines he started working in the trucking industry in the Basin area. (R.598, pg
146) He later incorporated N.J. Trucking Inc. 17 years prior to this marriage in
5

1982 as sole shareholder and only owner of the corporation. (R.598, pg 146) Mr.
Brough had been married two times prior to the marriage with Kathryn Brough.
(R. 598, pg 145) At the time of trial he was 60 years old. (R. 598, pg 145) He had
four children with his first wife and he was divorced from his second wife in 1993.
At the time of the divorce the business had only on employee.
7. On July 9, 1998 prior to the marriage, the parties executed before a
Notary a one-page premarital agreement that had been typed by Kathryn C.
Brough. (R. 598, pg. 65) (Addendum, pg. 23) Mrs. Brough contacted an attorney
first concerning the prenuptial agreement. Then in an effort to save costs, she
personally typed the agreement. (R. 598, pg. 8) In relation to the prenuptial
agreement that was signed before a Notary Public, Mrs. Brough knew the business
was a corporation when she typed up the agreement. (R. 598, pg.65) She was
aware that Mr. Brough always owned 100% of the shares and understood she was
an employee. (R.598, pg. 69)
8. Concerning the prenuptial agreement, Kathryn Brough stated at trial,
"The fact is I don't want and didn't want anything Jim had prior..." (R. 598 pg. 14)
She was never issued any shares of the business and was at all times only an hourly
employee. (R. 598, pg. 69) Prior to the marriage, Kathryn Brough had been the
secretary and receptionist at N. J. Trucking, Inc. in 1993 for two years and was
familiar with the business. (R. 598, pg. 71) After quitting work for the business as a
receptionist, about three years later, she again asked Mr. Brough for a job. At that
time, she became a "spiffer" or cleaner of the shop in Roosevelt since there was
6

another person working in the office. (R. 598, pg. 72) Later she became secretary at
the business.
9. After the marriage, Kathryn Brough continually maintained separate
financial accounts in her name only at Zions Bank and Mountain America Credit
Union. She deposited the funds that were received from employment at Brough
Trucking and Crane Service, Inc. (R. 598, pg. 67) At trial the Petitioner was asked
a question whether the finances of the parties were basically separate and she
responded, "Yah." (R. 598, pg. 106)
10. After the marriage, when Mrs. Brough received funds from a divorce
settlement from her fourth husband, she kept that property separate and deposited
it in her account. She used the funds to pay off her own four or five credit card
debts. (R. 598, pg. 68) Kathryn Brough had $3,000.00 in her separate accounts at
the time of separation with Mr. Brough in 2005 and no joint accounts.
11. Richard James Brough also maintained separate personal checking
accounts at Wells Fargo Bank and Mountain America Credit Union after the
marriage through separation. (R. 598, pg. 66) From those accounts he produced
detailed records concerning all of the expenditures to construct the Neola
residence that was jointly titled in both parties names at trial as set forth in a large,
three-ring binder entered into evidence at trial as Respondent's Exhibit 15. (See
Summary from Exhibit 15, Addendum, pg. 168)
12. Mrs. Brough never produced any checks in evidence that proved any
expenditure that she actually made to construct the residence in Neola, Utah. (R.
7

598, pg. 69) Kathryn Brough did personally work on the construction, painting
and finishing of the residence. She only spent money on temporary landscaping at
a local nursery for the Neola residence. (R. 598, pg. 43)
13. Concerning her employment, every year Kathryn Brough received W-2
from the Corporation as follows:
TOTAL WAGES, TIPS, OTHER COMP. 1

YEAR
2000

$10,640.00

2001

$8,880.00

2002

$7,680.00

2003

$6,876.00

2004

$10,588.50

2005 (year of separation)

$4,765.60

14. Kathryn Brough kept track of her hours worked as an employee during
the time she was employed by Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc. (R. 598,
pg. 72) In the last part of her employment a time-card system was implemented to
keep track of her hours as an employee. (R. 598, pg. 72)
15. She wrote the word "Quit" on her time card on May 8, 2005.
(Respondent's Exhibit 18) (R. 598, pg. 84)
16. Prior to the marriage, Mr. Brough owned a single-family residence at
19487 East River Road, Duchesne County, Utah that was sold after the marriage
for approximately $114,000.00. Richard Brough received a check of $24,702.84
8

that was deposited into his accounts and were used to construct the house in
Neola5 Utah. (Respondent's Exhibit 15c and 35) He paid off a note when he sold
his premarital residence at 19487 East River Road in Duchesne County, Utah to
use the money to build the Neola residence.
17. Prior to the marriage, Mr. Brough owned five acres near Fruitland,
Utah referred to as the "Bandana Ranch", which he sold after the marriage and
received $18,521.51 that went to the Neola residence. (Respondent's Exhibit 35)
Mr. Brough testified that the funds from the sale of separate property were
intended for and used to purchase the real property for the residence in Neola,
Utah and received the funds the same month as when the closing took place on the
purchase of the property. (Respondent's Exhibit 31)(R. 598, pg. 198)
18. Richard Brough also traced the other side of the transactions by
testifying a length concerning the source of funds into the checking accounts set
forth in Exhibits 15, 15c and 39. (Addendum, pg. 215) The exhibits were
identified at trial corroborating the separate funds and property deposited into the
separate accounts. These amounts include:
a. $30,000.00 from the sale of the Duchesne Property from the buyers of
$30,000.00. (See also Respondent's Exhibit 31)
b. A deposit on 05/01/2002 for sale of $10,810.82 for Richard Brough's
House owned prior to the marriage (in Kathryn Brough's handwriting).
c. A deposit of $54,000.00 on 05/01/2000 that was deposited into the NJ
trucking account from the sale of a shop the Respondent owned in Duchene Utah,
since 1988. (R. 598, pg 178 and 193) (Exhibit 30)
d. $50,000.00 for the sale of used oil field equipment owned for 15 years..
(R.598,pgl78)
e. $30,000.00 from Chotaw for an Oil Derrick purchased from the business.
(R.598,pgl79)
9

f. $5,000 Sale of used oil field equipment by cashier's check. (R. 598, pg
179)
g. A deposit of $3,000 for oilfield equipment sold which was acquired prior
to the marriage. (R. 598, pg 179)
h. A cashier's check in the amount of $30,000 to Brough Trucking on
05/17/2001. (R. 598, pg 179 and 205)

19 . In summary Richard Brough's uncontested Exhibit 15 proved that all
of the costs to construct the Neola residence were paid for by checks from the
business or from Mr. Brough's personal fund to construct Neola residence, and are
as follows:
I. Brough Trucking & Crane Service Inc.
ii. N. J. Trucking (checking account)
iii. Jim Brough, (personal checking account)
TOTAL

$166,373.89
$86,559.12
$73,318.10
$326,251.11

20. On October 15, 2008, a loan from Zions bank in the amount of
$160,000.00 was obtained using the Neola Residence as collateral. The loan was
used to pay business debts of Brough Trucking and Crane Service, Inc. The
business paid all of the payments on this business loan. (R. 598, pg 179) At trial
Mr. Brough agreed to assume the debt in the divorce and to refinance this
property. (R. 598, pg 179)
21. Both parties indicated the $160,000.00 loan was for a business purpose,
which was required when Richard Brough was laid up with a broken foot and the
company was having difficulty operating. (R. 598, pg. 80 & 168) Kathryn Brough
signed the loan because she was on the title to the property.

10

22. According to an exhibit offered and received without objection,
Kathryn Brough, excluding the pickup truck awarded in the divorce for which Mr.
Brough made all the payments, had $3,829.00 more in joint personal property than
acquired during the marriage to Richard Brough if each party was awarded the
property in their possession. (R. 598, pg.160). Kathryn Brough was allowed by
Richard Brough to use a horse trailer to make several trips to remove personal
property when she separated, and therefore Mr. Brough requested each party
should be found to have in their possession at the time of trial an equal amount of
joint marital property.
23. Mr. Brough noted that some of the items that Mrs. Brough was
requesting at trial included elk horn chandeliers and other items attached as
fixtures to the residence. (R. 598, pg. 163) Mrs. Brough acknowledged that some
of the property that she listed as personal property that she wished to be awarded
and which the Judge did award to her were fixtures inside the residence such as
dimming lights and T.V. stands. (R. 598, pg. 104) The Findings signed by the
Judge gave 100% of the additional properly she requested on her exhibit list,
including all of the horses and the fixtures in the Neola house. (Addendum, pg. 20,

24. Kathryn Brough was financially able to make prior to trial at least
$7,000.00 in payments at the rate of up to $200.00 per month to her attorney. (R.
598, pg. 150) In addition, after the time of separation since March 2007, Mrs.

11

Brough was not paying rent to any landlord because she was living on her
mother's property.
25. She was able to purchase with her own funds a double wide trailer for
$10,000.00 to place free of charge on her mother's property. The Findings signed
by the Judge required Mr. Brough to pay all of her fees at trial without a reduction
for amounts paid.
26. The expert witness Brad Townsend was selected by Kathryn Brough's
attorney to act as her expert during trial by a motion resulting in a pretrial order
that reserved the apportionment of costs for trial. (R. 98)(R. 598, pg 124-142) In
relation to the allegation of enhanced value, the appraiser stated that he was unable
to determine a value for the corporation at the time of the marriage. (See Report of
Appraiser, Addendum pg. 28) Brad Townsend's total bill to testify was
$12,707.00 that Mr. Brough had to pay; plus he already had paid $1,500.00 for the
appraisal by equipment appraiser, Ron Liese. The Court had reserved the
allocation of costs for trial, but ordered Mr. Brough to assume all the costs in the
adopted Findings drafted by the Petitioner's counsel. (Addendum pg 21, ^ 13)
27. Brad Townsend in the report did not find that there was any good will
over the basic value of the trucking equipment. (R. 598, pg. 128) Further, the
expert, Brad Townsend, testified that there was no enhanced value of the income
stream of the business in excess of the fair salary paid to Mr. Brough to pay for the
work efforts of Mr. Brough. (R. 598, pg. 129) This included his personal expenses
out of the business.
12

28. The basis for valuation by expert Townsend was the value of the sale
of the equipment which was an enhanced book value based upon the trucks, crane
and equipment appraisal by Ron Liese and recent tax notices as to the land. (R.
598, pg. 134) Mr. Liese was retained and paid for by the Respondent only after the
appraisal by Brad Townsend, which had used traditional techniques for economic
valuation of a small business, indicated that there was no value in the business
except the value in the used equipment and assets. (R. 598, pg. 131)
29. Brad Townsend's opinion of a fair salary for Mr. Brough adjusted for
the payment of directly out of business for personal expenditures that were
provided to him by Mr. Brough, was as follows:
2003

$15,000

2004
2005
2006
2007

$57,000
$40,000
$ 25,000
$53,000

Mr. Brough described the various business equipment owned by the
corporation in relation to the corporation's offering of business services. Mr.
Brough acknowledged that he had many different trailers and equipment that he
did not use on an everyday basis and were kept because of they depended on the
type of service call made in relation to the ongoing business. (R. 598, pg. 155)
30. During the marriage the trucking company purchased property known
as the Ballard property and the Respondent indicated that there was one of the
deeds issued on the property in the name of Kathryn Brough that had to be
corrected. He told Mrs. Brough that it was a trucking company asset and the
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company was paying for it. Mrs. Brough signed a corrective deed transferring the
interest in that property back to the corporation. (R. 598, pg. 172)
SUMMARY O F A R G U M E N T

After trial, Mr. Brough, upon learning the trial court of adopted without
changing the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by the
Petitioner, filed a Motion for New Trial. The proposed findings were prepared
without any ruling form the court in an argumentative style by both attorneys. The
procedure of selecting one as the prevailing party is not consistent with basic
fairness and justice and fundamental trial procedure in the State of Utah. This
unique manner of entering a ruling gives beyond an impression of unfairness and
prejudice to the public concerning the role of an independent judiciary. The
court's procedures in ruling on a contested divorce by either accepting or rejecting
proposed Findings in totality is an unfair procedure in the context of a contested
divorce proceeding and the Appellant respectfully submits that this alone requires
reversal of the Order denying Motion for New Trial.
Further the Court failed to enforce a signed and notarized prenuptial
agreement that should have totally excluded the business from distribution in the
divorce. Further, as an alternative ground, the trial judge also adopted an arbitrary
low value for the premarital interest in the business and failed to recognize that the
residence in Neola, the second major asset subject to distribution in the action, was
traced to the Respondent's separate property. The unfairness of the approach of
the court is demonstrated by adopting a Decree which awarded the Petitioner
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$386,500.00 and then required Mr. Brough to pay approximately $50,000.00 of
her attorney fees, costs for her expert. The Court even required Mr. Brough to pay
for her real estate appraisal even though he paid for a second one at trial.

ARGUMENT

POINT I

THE ADOPTION BY THE JUDGE BY SIGNING WITHOUT CHANGING
THE FINDINGS DRAFTED BY PETITIONER'S COUNSEL REQUIRES A
NEW TRIAL
A one-day trial was held on July 9, 2008. At the conclusion of the trial and
after argument, the trial judge stated as follows:
THE COURT: This case presented some interesting concepts and
some interesting allocations. I think that -and I apologize right up
front for doing this and I need to research in depth the prenuptial
thing, both in the facts and the equity. I recall a case that I read
which isn't in the memorandums about a coal mine subject to a
prenup agreement which the Court dealt with royalties and I think
interest had accrued on the production or the appreciation of the
mine. I need to find that case and read it again. There's some other
cases that are on point and I want to take a good look at that. I'm
going to spend some time tomorrow and organize this and so that I
don't drop the ball but I'm going to order each of you to prepare
findings, conclusion and a decree and simultaneously submit those.
I'm thinking 30 days. If you want to do it - will that work for both of
you? (R. 598, Transcript of Trial, pg. 270)

After a series of questions, counsel for Mr. Brough asked about preparing
and submitting Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. In response,
the record reflects the following exchange:
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MR. GAITHER: Do you want me to prepare that or -I'll prepare that
and submit that and then 30 days would be agreeable on the
proposed findings and conclusions.
THE COURT: Yes, if you'll do that then I've got my-I'll look at
those and probably draft something on my own, but I'd like you to
do that.
MR. GAITHER: Thank you. Could I ask that we could I've done
this before and footnoted some of the conclusions of law. Would the
Court like to read footnotes or rather do a memorandum?
THE COURT: If you would rather do footnotes - 1 don't care. I
guess we need to talk about the prenup agreement.
The court indicated that the proposed findings should be simultaneously
filed by Friday, August 8, 2008. The Judge also directed counsel for Mr. Brough
to prepare a partial Decree of Divorce setting aside the marriage relationship
pending the property award. That Decree was submitted to the court by the
Respondent's Attorney by mail on July 12, 2008; but was not entered until the day
of the hearing on the Motion for New Trial in September 2008. It was not until
counsel for Mr. Brough at the hearing brought up the fact that the court had signed
the proposed Decree submitted by the Petitioner on the property issues but had
neglected to signed the Decree submitted by the Respondent, that the Decree of
Divorce setting aside the marriage relationship was signed by the Court. (Both sets
of Decrees and Findings are set forth in the Addendum at pages 01 & 208.)
Instead of issuing a ruling after the proposed findings were submitted by
both attorneys, a month later and without issuing any memorandum the trial judge
signed without changing the set of proposed Findings filed by the Petitioner's
attorney and the Decree filed by the Petitioner's attorney. The documents were
signed without any modifications or changes and even include footnotes placed on
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the documents by Petitioner's attorney to argue point of law. (See Addendum page
19). Thereafter, Counsel for the Petitioner filed a "Notice of Entry of Decree"
(Addendum, pg. 202). Upon discovering what had happened, the Respondent then
filed a Motion for New Trial and Relief from Judgment. (Addendum, pg. 57 & 62)
After discovering the adoption in total of the Petitioner's proposed Findings
by signing the document submitted, counsel for Mr. Brough filed an Affidavit in
support of the Motion for New Trial as follows:
I, Randall T. Gaither, being first duly sworn upon oath hereby
deposes and states as follows:
1. In the above-entitled case, as the trial attorney for
the Respondent, it was my understanding that the Court would issue
a written ruling which would be mailed to each party. (See Minute
Entry of July 9, 2008.)
2. Having tried divorce cases for over thirty years in
proceedings throughout the State of Utah each party may submit
"proposed" findings which usually function as each parties'
argument of legal position to the Court when the Court has not yet
made a ruling. In this case I submitted "proposed" findings and not
final Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law authorized by any
ruling of the Court. Even if a prevailing party is directed to prepare
findings based on an oral ruling, the opposing party is given an
opportunity to object....
11. As Attorney for the Respondent, my assumption
was that the Court would collaboratively use the proposed findings
from either party, as well as make its own proposed findings and
ruling on evidence and the various issues, then issue a Ruling or
Memorandum Decision. In that regard, I submitted a cover letter
with a disk with my proposed findings to assist the Court in drafting
its own findings, a procedure used in other cases within the State of
Utah.
12. If I had known that the Court was using a
procedure in which the Court would choose between two sets of
competing proposed Findings of Fact and then to enter one or the
other in its totality, then I would have framed the Respondent's
proposed findings in a different fashion. Further, I would have
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requested oral argument in order to respond and object to any final
findings in light of the evidence.
13. In light of my practice and litigation of divorce
matters, I have been surprised by the procedures and lack of notice
of the trial court and request that relief be granted on relevant
Motions filed with this Affidavit.(See also Exhibits to Affidavit of
Randal Gaither: Addendum pg 73-103)
Counsel for Mr. Brough submitted in a Motion for New Trial that the
Decree should be set aside because if it was the Court's intention to mechanically
adopt Findings it was never communicated to the attorneys at the close of the trial.
At the hearing on the Motion for New Trial held on September 25, 2008, the
following exchange took place at the beginning of the hearing:
THE COURT: Gentlemen, I thought probably the thing to do to
expedite this, I understood there was some questions about my
handling the case. I had asked each of you to prepare findings,
conclusions, and a decree and then I was going to look them over
and decide which one that I would sign and that's all I did. I didn't
intend to write another decision or make any amendments. I
furnished to you notes, findings of fact, conclusions and a decree
which I dictated to my secretary in Vernal the day after this trial and
if you'll read through those there are some holes that are missing but
basically you can get the concept of what my thinking was. If you
read that and go through that, you'll see that Mr. Allred's findings
and conclusions pretty much paralleled my own thinking and that's
the road that I took and that's why I executed his documents.
Now at this point I guess we better hear from counsel and see
if I can satisfy your questions. Mr. Gaither?
MR. GAITHER: Your Honor, I've seen this document (inaudible)
went into the clerk's office and asked for the file and so I've read
and looked at this and I would submit there's a substantial difference
between Mr. Allred's and the Court's findings and this does, I would
submit support our position that the judgment and decree should be
set aside as being mechanically adopted and if that was the Court's
intention, as I put in my affidavit, I had no idea that it was going to
be, -you were going to accept one or accept the other. I've neverTHE COURT: I thought I was pretty clear on that. (R599, pg. 2)
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The Appellant submits that an objective review of all of the statements
made by the trial judge from the bench at the conclusion of the trial does not
indicate the "either/or" procedure to be used to decide on one or another of the
proposed Findings of Fact. At the hearing the Court identified a draft of Findings
of Fact that the Judge had drafted after the trial and placed in the file. The Court
described the document as "formulation of present thought impressions" and
counsel for the Respondent had that document marked as a Exhibit One at the
hearing on Motion for New Trial. (See Exhibit at Addendum pg. 24 and the Courts
discussion at Addendum pg. 143.) Judge Anderson acknowledged at the hearing
for new trial the procedure he adopted of not changing the entire submission of the
Petitioner but attempted to justify it by stating, "When I reviewed his [Alfred's
Findings] I totally agreed with what he put down and how it was presented." (R.
599, pg. 12)
Counsel for Mr. Brough pointed out at the hearing on the Motion for New
Trial that there was actually a substantial difference between what the court
described as a "formulation of present thought impressions" with the Findings of
Fact filed by Attorney Allred. The material differences are as follows:
1. Value of the residence of $312,000.00 in the Court's draft {Exhibit One
at the hearing on Motion for New Trial; Addendum, pg. 24) and $325,000 in
the findings prepared by Petitioner's Attorney. (Addendum, pg. 10 ^[18)
2. As to the business, the approach in Exhibit One at the hearing on
Motion for New Trial indicated the business was to be valued at $200,000.00
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as the "date of marriage". (Addendum, pg. 25 ^ 7) In the signed Findings, the
business was valued in the amount of $492,000.00 without a deduction for
premarital value of $44,000.00. (Addendum, pg. 16 If 2)
3. Exhibit One at the hearing on Motion for New Trial recognized the
$160,000.00 loan for Zions Bank as a business loan. (Addendum, pg. 261 9) In
the signed Findings, the Respondent had to pay one-half of the value of the
business and also assume the balance of the $160,000.00 loan. (Addendum, pg.
201(10)
4. The court's draft (Exhibit One at the hearing on Motion for New Trial)
indicated that the prenuptial agreement was valid but limited to the value of
premarital property up to marriage. (Addendum, pg. 26, Conclusions of Law
Tf 1) In the signed Conclusions of Law, the prenuptial agreement was not valid
because it was "not negotiated" and there was no disclosure of assets and
limited to what Respondent "owned at the time of the marriage as listed on that
document." (Addendum, pg. 15, Conclusions of Law ^f 1)
During a colloquy between the Attorney for the Respondent and the Trial
Judge at the hearing for New Trial, Judge Anderson ended it by stating; "I'll give
you the address of the Court of Appeals if you want." (R. 599, pg. 14) The judge
then proceeded to deny the Motion for New Trial, the Motion to Alter and Amend
the Judgment. (R. 599, pg. 14)
It is the traditional role of the judge to make the equitable adjustments that
always take place in any contested divorce proceeding. A common phrase used by
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both divorce attorneys and Courts in relation to divorce proceedings is that at a
divorce trial "neither party is satisfied with the results". Although not a rule of
law5 this exemplifies a situation where each party argues their best and sometimes
emotional position. The Court is left to make offsets, credits and determinations
based upon the Appellate decision and the Court's experience. However, under
Judge Anderson's procedure used in this matter, one party would always be very
happy with the ruling because all adjustments would go totally their way. For
example, the Petitioner received 100% of the personal household property she
requested even though Mr. Brough had testified and identified regarding his
personal property and premarital assets. Even property identified as fixtures to the
house went to the Petitioner if Mr. Brough took the residence.
Inexplicably, the trial judge abandoned the usual decision making process
and signed one of the two sets of proposed Findings. No explanatory
Memorandum of Decision of the Court was filed. There was no ruling issued by
the Court as to any reason for this unusual and unfair procedure until Mr. Brough
filed a Motion for New Trial.
The Appellant submits that the procedure raises issues of an inappropriate
and unconstitutional abdication of basic judicial authority and an illegal delegation
of judicial function. In Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213 (Utah Ct App. 1990) the Utah
Court of Appeals described the problem at issue in this proceedings:
As to appellants1 strange assertion that the court should not draft its own
findings, rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure gives the court the
responsibility of finding the facts and stating its Conclusions of law and
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judgment. See Boyer Co. v. Lignell, 567 P.2d 1112, 1113-4 (Utah 1977).
The court may ask the prevailing counsel to submit findings to aid the court
in making these necessary findings. Id. at 1113. However, the court should
not "mechanically adopt" these findings. Id. The trial court thus has the
ultimate discretion in determining the findings of fact and Conclusions of
law. At 216

In Boyer Co. v. Lignell, 567 P.2d 1112 (Utahl977), the Utah Supreme
Court heard objections from counsel before adopting findings of opposing counsel
ruling that the submitting party had prevailed. The presumption or ruling as to
Findings of Fact "is an important part of the judicial function," one that is designed
to flesh out the rationale for the decision and one that "the Judge cannot
surrender... to counsel." Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2578
(1971) In Automatic Control Products v. Tel-Tech, Inc, 780 P.2d 1258, (Utah
1989), the Court said the Boyer decision cautioned trial courts not to mechanically
adopt Findings of Fact prepared and submitted by the prevailing party's attorney.
Here, there were no instructions to either party as the prevailing party.
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution, "the judicial
power is vested in a Supreme Court, in a trial court of general jurisdiction .. ., and
in such other courts as the Legislature by statute may establish." Utah Const. Art.
VIII, § L The courts should not abdicate this representation by delegating to one
attorney in a complicated divorce trial the responsibility to make the final ruling of
the trial on all issues. Any attempt to place the exercise of the judicial power
outside the control of the judiciary threatens "the fundamental integrity of the
judicial branch." In re Criminal Investigation, 7th Dist. Ct, 754 P.2d 633, at 642
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(Utah 1988) In Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), the Court
indicated Court Commissioners can make recommendations to the court regarding
any issue in domestic relations if the ultimate decision making remains with the
Judge and there is no improper delegation of judicial authority.
In Salt Lake City v. Olms, 881 P.2d 844(Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme
Court defined the Article VIII, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution and stated:
Core functions or powers of the various branches of government are
clearly nondelegable under the Utah Constitution. See, e.g., Sandy City v. Salt
Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 221 (Utah 1992) (holding that legislative functions,
such as powers of zoning and rezoning, cannot be delegated); State v. Gallion,
572 P.2d 683, 687 (Utah 1977) (holding that Utah Const, art. VI, § 1 limits
legislature's ability to delegate legislative powers or functions to others); In re
Bridwell, 25 Utah 2d 1, 2, 474 P.2d 116, 116 (Utah 1970) (holding that Utah
Supreme Court cannot delegate its duty to discipline an erring attorney to
others); accord State v. Green, 793 P.2d 912, 916 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that "crime definition and penalty powers are essential legislative
functions that cannot constitutionally be delegated by the Utah Legislature to
any other person or body").
In Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App, 176 P.3d 476,1J17, the Court
noted the importance of the findings in a divorce matter noting that on appeal the
Appellate court must be able to review the written and oral Findings of Fact
together to determine if they are sufficient to support the Trial court's rulings. The
court stated:
We note, however, that for purposes of appellate review, written
findings are the better practice because they reduce the likelihood of
ambiguity created by an incomplete or unclear record. We can find
no indication, either in the oral and written findings or elsewhere in
the record, of the classification of the relevant items as marital or
separate property. Furthermore, despite careful review of the trial
transcript and the written and oral findings, we can find no place
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where the trial court assigned values to the various items of property.
at^ll
The procedure employed by the judge after trial is even more prejudicial
because Mr. Brough and his attorney were awaiting a ruling by the court. In a
contested divorce a District Court's division determinations should explain either
the factual basis or legal analysis supporting its determinations and provide the
appellate court with enough information to allow meaningful review. Leppert v.
Leppert, 2009 UT App 10, 200 P.3d 223.
In Lyman v. Lyman, 633 N.Y. S. 2d 135, 220 A.D. 2d 368 (1st Dept' 1995),
the court ordered a new trial in a case where the Judge adopted by signing a
Defendant's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The court noted
that the trial court failed to comply with the requirements of domestic relations
law and gave an indication of the reasoning employed by the trial court for its
determination of the various issues in the divorce.
The general law is set forth in a recent publication from American
Jurisprudence as follows:
As long as the court's findings in a divorce action reflect a careful
review of the evidence and independent decision-making, they are
not reversible because they are based on a party's proposed findings,
or on a preprinted document for findings of fact and conclusions of
law, although the better practice is for the court to prepare its own
findings. However, a trial court fails to comply with a statute
requiring the court set forth the factors considered and the reasons
for its decision in a divorce case where the findings are inconsistent
with the evidence in the record, or if the court simply signs a party's
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, except in the "rare
and unusual case" where the counsel's brief effectively speaks for
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the court. AM. JUR. 2nded.y Divorce and Separation (8th revision)
pg. 566 (2008)

Further, the final partial Decree should have been submitted to counsel for
Richard Brough for an opportunity to object to the partial Decree under Rule 7 of
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, (Addendum, pg. ii) Ironically, the Decree of
Divorce prepared by the Attorney for Mr. Brough was ignored by the trial judge
and not entered when the court signed the partial Decree as to property. The
Decree as to property contains time limits and an alternate formula requiring
election for payment of the Judgment amounts as was designed by counsel for the
Petitioner without any advance ruling or input by the judge. The Decree as an
Order should have been served on opposing counsel prior to being signed under
Rule 7 of The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Kathryn Brough was not the prevailing party here until the court made that
decision by ruling 100% in her favor by adopting in total the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law unilaterally drafted by her attorney. In most divorces there is
not a prevailing party. Here, the court ruled one party prevailed and adopted the
reasoning and Findings of that one party. While this procedure may be
appropriate in a simple matter such as a collection case where there is a specific
amount of money owed or not owed, it is not appropriate in a contested divorce
matter. This was not a single-issue matter that did not require balancing of
competing issues and equitable balancing of factors from the bench.
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The Findings adopted by the Court included argumentative findings drafted
to favor the Plaintiffs position on every issue. For example see the findings about
Mr. Brough's purchase of land by the Corporation known as the "Ballard
Property" (Addendum, pg. 13 |26) The language indicates that "they" implying
the husband and wife purchased property jointly in some manner. This may have
been discussed between the husband and wife as expected. However, the
undisputed evidence is that the Petitioner signed a corrective deed changing the
title on the "Ballard" also referred to as the "Pine Tech" property to reflect the
intent of the parties that the acquisition of that property was by Brough Trucking
& Crane Service, Inc. (Respondent's Exhibit 13, Addendum pg 27)1 The Ballard
property is a joint venture with Byron Gibson and the trucking company, not the
parties and when Mr. Brough found that Kathy Brough had put her name on the
property he had it corrected. The business venture commenced when the business
started acquiring property in 2004. The 80 acres in Ballard is not marital property
and was subject to the prenuptial agreement.
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs Findings of
Fact, requires that ff[i]t will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of
law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the
evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision filed by the court."
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). Here the court stated nothing orally and did not issue an
official signed memorandum decision, although the court started to draft such
1

Petitioner's Testimony R. 598 pgs 48 to 53 and Respondents at pgs 171 to 172
26

document. {Exhibit One at the hearing on Motion for New Trial; Addendum, pg.
24)
In Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847 (UT App 1989), the Appellate Court stated
the traditional role of the trial court in cases tried to the bench, the court is
required to find the facts specially and relate its decision on findings of fact which
resolve the material factual uncertainties. The Court stated:
In assessing the sufficiency of the findings . . . we are not confined
to the contents of a particular document entitled 'Findings'; rather,
the findings may be expressed orally from the bench or contained in
other documents . . . . " at 849. Furthermore, "[a]dequate findings are
. . . necessary for [appellate courts] to perform [their] assigned
review function." Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986). at
849
Further any Decree based upon ruling and findings should have been
submitted to the attorneys to allow objections to be filed and a Decree to be
drafted. Especially in light of the unique formula set forth in the Decree requiring
Mr. Brough to make an election which was unilaterally designed by Petitioner's
counsel without any input whatsoever from the trial judge.
Therefore, based upon the failure to make a judicial ruling and issue
appropriate Findings based on the court's determination from the evidence, the
judgment should be set aside and a new trial ordered. This is not just a procedural
error but also a serious deficiency that affects the administration of justice
concerning the role of a judge in civil proceedings in granting to both parties a fair
and equitable trial. The entire ruling should be set aside and a new trial ordered.
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POINT II
THE NOTARIZED PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT WAS ENFORCEABLE.
On July 9, 1998, the parties in contemplation of marriage executed before a
Notary Public a simple premarital agreement. (See Respondent's Exhibit 1;
Addendum, pg. 23) Mrs. Brough had typed this document after she contacted a
local attorney. Through the use of unambiguous language, Kathryn Brough agreed
that upon marriage she held "no claim to any personal properties, assets or money
of Richard J. Brough, N. J. Trucking Inc., the Glass Store, or any personal or
family properties of Richard J. Brough". (See Respondent's Exhibit 1; Addendum,
pg. 23) The business name was later amended to be Brough Trucking & Crane
Service, Inc. Kathryn Brough was fully aware that Mr. Brough owned 100% of
the shares of the business corporation and made management decisions. As a
consideration, her husband promised Kathryn Brough in the agreement that she
would not be responsible for the ongoing debts occurring from the listed properties
and Mr. Brough agreed to assume all future business debts.
Utah Code Annotated § 30-8-3(1953) states that "A premarital agreement
must be in writing and signed by both parties. It is enforceable without
consideration." Prenuptial agreements are valid so long as the opponent proves no
fraud, coercion, or material non-disclosure. Huckv. Huck, 734 P.2d 417 (Utah
1986). In order to meet this standard, the Petitioner as the party seeking to set
aside the agreement had the burden of showing fraud, mistake or non-disclosure
by clear and convincing evidence. In Peterson v. Peterson, 254, 571 P.2d 1360
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(Utah 1977) the Court stated as to the standard to be applied by a party seeking to
set aside in a matter such as this:

Among the classes of cases to which this special standard of persuasion
(clear and convincing proof) has been applied are the following: (1) charges
of fraud, and undue influence, (2) suits on oral contracts to make a will, and
suits to establish the terms of a lost will, (3) suits for the specific
performance of an oral contract, (4) proceedings to set aside, reform or
modify written transactions or official acts on grounds of fraud, mistake or
incompleteness, and (5) miscellaneous types of claims and defenses,
varying from state to state, where there is thought to be special danger of
deception, or where the court considers that the particular type of claim
should be disfavored on policy grounds.

In that regard, Kathryn Brough did not introduce any material evidence or
facts at trial to show that the prenuptial agreement was signed on the basis of any
claim of fraud or duress. The Petitioner did not meet the burden of proving that
the business described in the agreement was covered by the contract and the trial
court should have adopted Respondent's proposed Findings of Fact and position
that stated:
7. The Petitioner did not introduce any evidence or facts at trial to show
that the prenuptial agreement was signed on the basis of any claim of fraud
or duress. (Addendum, pg. 107)
Kathy Brough's conduct in contacting a lawyer and in typing the agreement
negates any claim of coercion. There was no claim whatsoever that Mr. Brough
failed to disclose any property to her since she worked at the business six years
prior to the marriage and the parties were living together. The document details

29

the names of the business to remain separate property and to which she waived a
claim on the consideration of not being liable in the future for any business debts.
In Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, 984 P.2d 987, the wife failed to show the
elements necessary to establish coercion, fraud, misrepresentation, or duress. The
Court there stated:
Sheila presented no evidence that Thomas concealed any material facts
from her, nor has she shown that she was unaware of the substance of
what she was giving or receiving from the contract. At \2A

Marriage agreements are to be construed and treated as contracts in general
and then enforced. Berman v. Berman, 749 P.2d 1271 (UT App 1988) However,
here the agreement was neither construed nor enforced by the trial court as to the
trucking business described in the document. While mentioned at the close of trial
as an issue to be briefed, later the court essentially disregarded the agreement by
limiting it to separate premarital property that does not require a prenuptial
agreement.
The trial judge should have taken the first step in interpreting a prenuptial
agreement by looking "to the four corners of the agreement to determine the
intention of the parties." Neilson v. Neilson, 780 P.2d 1264 (Utah App 1988).
Instead no meaningful analysis was ever conducted. This was the key issue at trial
and the trial court should have enforced the agreement by segregating property
subject to the agreement from distribution.
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There should have been a straight forward application should have been as
in Berman v. Berman 749 P.2d 1271 (Utah CT App 1988), in which the Court of
Appeals stated:
Plaintiff argues that the antenuptial agreement only concerned the
defendant's business assets, not the house, because the only asset
specifically mentioned in the agreement was the billiard business.
Defendant argues that the agreement means exactly what it says and
exempts " real and personal property," including the house, from inclusion
in the marital estate. The house should have been preserved as the separate
property of defendant. We find the trial court erred when it did not include
the house in the antenuptial agreement.

As to the context of the agreement in light of the circumstances of this
marriage, the court should also consider the relevant factors as supporting
enforcement of the agreement. The facts concern the number or prior divorces,
the parties' age, work history, the length of time Mr. Brough owned his business
that were existing when the agreement was signed. Kathryn Brough testified that
she had been married and divorced four previous times before this marriage. At
trial, Kathryn Brough acknowledged her first job and last job prior to separation
was an employee and she never had management responsibilities. This is the type
of factual scenario in which a simple prenuptial agreement is expected between
parties getting married later in life and where the parties kept property separate in
their own financial accounts after the marriage.
The next issue under the premarital agreement concerns the Neola
residence titled in both names. There is a legal issue as to this property that
remains different from the business corporation. At the trial, Kathryn Brough did
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not object to the specific accounting set forth in Richard Brough's Exhibit 15 that
demonstrated the costs of building the Neola residence. (See the detailed summary
of the Exhibit set forth in the Addendum at pg. 168) There is no question that the
money came from either the premarital business assets of Mr. Brough or from his
separate property in his personal checking accounts. Counsel for the Petitioner
indicated that the Petitioner did not have any objection to the receipt of Exhibit 15
and believed that it actually shows the amounts paid on the residence by the
business. (R. 598, pg. 175)
In Rudman v. Rudrnan, 812 P.2d 73 (Utah App 1991), this Court stated as
follows:
The court found that Mr. Rudman's premarital assets were not commingled
with marital property, and that he maintained them as separate entities,
including those that were improved through expansion or remodeling.
Thus, under the parties' prenuptial agreement, the loan receivables were
properly characterized as premarital assets, as were the condominiums and
the cabin, at 76
In Rudman, the trial court found that a fair reading of the agreement clearly
separated premarital property from property accumulated after the marriage. The
trial court also found that under the agreement any premarital property, together
with any interest or increase, would remain the property of the owner and any
property acquired after the marriage would be marital, "less that amount utilized
for its acquisition that can be traced to a point prior to the marriage." The Court of
Appeals stated:
We find no error in the trial court's legal interpretation of the document.
Under the terms of the prenuptial agreement, where each party relinquished
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all rights to previously acquired property of the other party, he or she would
also have no right to any increase in value or additional earnings that might
accrue to that properly. Likewise, any property acquired by the parties after
the marriage would accrue earnings into the marital estate. Additionally, if
any amounts used to acquire property during the marriage could be traced
to premarital property, those amounts would remain the separate property
of that individual. Thus, to preserve the premarital integrity of an asset that
has been arguably commingled with property acquired after the marriage,
that asset, or its severable part, must be traced to its original source.

In Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving Co. v. Blomquist, 111* P.2d 1382
(UT App 1988), the Supreme Court indicated that a resort to extrinsic evidence of
the parties' intent is permissible only if the contract document appears to express
the parties' agreement incompletely or if it is ambiguous in expressing that
agreement. Here, Kathryn Brough's self-serving comments about what Mr.
Brough's description of the premarital agreement as "dumb" was is totally
irrelevant after the agreement was received in evidence.
Richard Brough respectfully submits that the premarital agreement should
have been enforced first, as to the corporate business and secondly, as to the Neola
residence. The Appellant acknowledges that the residence is a separate issue from
the business and the court could have made a ruling based on the joint title as to
the prenuptial agreement as to the residence different than the corporation.
However, the Court should have the indicated that the trucking business
was separate from the residence and analyzed each asset separately. Instead the
trial court adopted the wording drafted by the Petitioner in an attempt to discount
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the premarital agreement entirely. In the Findings of Fact adopted by the court,
paragraph five states as follows concerning the prenuptial agreement:
The Respondent also had two older children who where of majority
age. Those children insisted that the Petitioner sign an agreement
not to claim any assets the Respondent then owned if the parties
divorced in the future. The Respondent stated that he thought the
request was dumb. The Petitioner, to appease the two children,
called an attorney, but, when informed of the costs of preparing a
prenuptial agreement, elected to write out a one paragraph statement
which she and the Respondent signed which is Respondent's Exhibit
1. There was no discussion or disclosure of what each party owned.
The testimony of the Petitioner, which was not rebutted, was that the
statement was only to apply to assets owned on the date of marriage
and not to further acquired assets or improvements to those assets.
The Respondent objected and disputed the evidence of self-serving intent,
or statements at trial and continues to dispute the matter on appeal. (R. 598, pg.
15) The undisputed fact is that both parties voluntarily executed the written
agreement before a Notary Public. Therefore, any evidence introduced as to
extrinsic intent or mental impressions was not relevant and material to the legal
enforcement of the contract received into evidence.
The Court allowed the testimony concerning issues outside the four corners
of the agreement that were self-serving statements from the Petitioner to avoid the
consequence of her actions in signing the premarital contract. The Court went on
to adopt the Conclusions of Law based on this evidence of the Petitioner that
stated;
The one paragraph prenuptial agreement was not negotiated by the
parties. There was no disclosure of assets in the prenuptial
agreement and it was prepared mainly to appease the older children.
It was intended to be limited to what the Respondent owned at the
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time of the marriage as listed on that document. (Addendum pg 15 ^f
7)
The Respondent's is fully protected from an award of one-half of the
business corporation and all pre-marital property by the agreement signed before
marriage. Therefore, the court erred in awarding one-half of the Respondent's
business to the Petitioner.
Further, there was no meaningful analysis of the residence built with
business funds. Based on the standard of review, this Court has the ability to
review the legal determination to enforce or limit the contract and to enter
directions to the lower court. The Respondent respectfully submits the lower court
should be instructed that business is not to be awarded and the matter returned for
new trial on the residence. Therefore, this Court on remand should order the lower
court to enforce the agreement as to the business and award a new trial on the
Neola residence.
POINT III
KATHRYN BROUGH FAILED TO PROVE ANY CO-MINGLING OF
SEPARATE PROPERTY OF THE BUSINESS.
As separate grounds to exempt Richard Brough's separate property from
the divorce other than from the prenuptial agreement, there exists another reason
to reverse the award of a one-half interest in the business to the Petitioner and onehalf of the Neola residence built with business funds. The general rule is that
equity requires that each party retain the separate property he or she brought into
the marriage, including any appreciation of the separate property. Dunn v. Dunn,
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802 P.2d 1314, 1320 (Utah App. 1990). The Court should have initially
categorized the business as separate and not marital property. The evidence did
not indicate that the property lost this classification.
The business property of Brough Trucking and Crane Service Inc. did not
lose its identity lost through commingling or exchanges. As in Child v. Child,
2008 UT App 338, 194 P.3d 205, ^[10, there were no findings by the trial court that
could support an exceptions to separate property general rule. Without any such
findings, the court indicated that there was no support for the trial court's
conclusion that the appreciation of husband's share of the business was marital
property, to be divided equally.
In Jensen v. Jensen, 2009 UT App 1, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed a
Decree in which the Husband only owed fifty percent of the Corporation. The
Court discussed the standard in determining the appropriateness of awarding
separate property to a non-owner spouse. The Court stated that:
"[F]or marital assets to be distributed, the assets must be in the
possession of one, or both, of the marital parties." Endrody v.
Endrody, 914 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Because
Husband does not own all of A&D, the corporation's total increase in
equity is "not available for distribution as [a] marital asset[]." Id. At
most, Husband owns fifty percent of the corporation; consequently
the trial court erroneously included Mark's share of A&D's equity in
its property award. Thus, the trial court's findings of fact are
inconsistent and contrary to law. \ 26

The Court in Jensen went on to hold that:
Wife did not assist in running the business nor contribute in any way
to its increase in equity. Moreover, it is unclear whether the increase
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in equity was due to anything other than inflation. See Burke v.
Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987) (rejecting claim to
appreciation of spouse's separate property, in part because the added
value "came solely from the effects of inflation"). Wife behaved in a
very normal and commendable manner by caring for the parties'
child, maintaining the household, and running her own part-time
business from their home. More is required, however, to justify an
award of Husband's separate property. ^27
The Petitioner is a non-owner spouse. While the award of the business may
have lead to a consideration of award of alimony for the length of the marriage,
Mrs. Brough cohabitated and waived alimony prior to trial. The undisputed
evidence is that the parties' maintained separate accounts and never co-mingled
any funds. During the marriage there were never any joint checking or joint
savings accounts and it was impossible to show any commingling by the
Petitioner. She kept her income and credit cards debts separate.
As to the value of the business at the time of the marriage, Brad Townsend,
was selected by the Petitioner and her attorney to act as her expert prior to and
during the trial. The Petitioner's expert stated in the report that he was unable to
determine a value for N.J. Trucking, Inc. at the time of the marriage in 1999. This
conclusion is set forth in the first paragraph of his report (Respondents Exhibit 40;
Addendum, pg. 28)
Instead of including that conclusion in drafting the Findings, counsel for
Mrs. Brough argued that the value should have been based upon the following
exchange which was impeachment on cross examination of the Respondent. That
testimony is as follows:

37

Q (BY MR. ALLRED) Do you remember what you valued the N.J.
Trucking business at in 1993 when you divorced Nancy?
A (Mr. Brough) No 5 1 don't.
Q How would $44,000 sound?
A I don't remember what we owed on it or what was paid for then.
Q Well, let me show you. Do you recognize whose handwriting that
is?
A I don't recognize the handwriting.
Q Does that look like a list of things that you and Nancy divided up?
A Could be.
Q Does it say Brough Trucking $44,000?
Where does it say that?
Q (Inaudible) right there, not Brough Trucking, N.J. Trucking,
$44,000 in your column?
A That's what it says. (R. 598 pg. 218)
This impeachment evidence concerning a financial declaration for a divorce six
years prior to the marriage was the sole basis for the figure of $44,000.00
advanced by petitioner's counsel that was adopted by the court for the "value" of
the business at the time of the marriage. This arbitrary "value" was used to impute
a value to benefit the Petitioner. To fill in the void created by Petitioner's expert
who said value at the time of marriage could not be determined and there was no
good will or valuable income stream, this remote amount was used to speculate in
favor of the Petitioner.
As to the Neola residence built exclusively with Mr. Bough's funds, Mrs.
Brough never introduced any checks in evidence that proved any expenditure that
she actually made to construct the residence in Neola, Utah. Kathryn Brough only
spent money on temporary landscaping at a local nursery. Kathryn Brough
indicated that she never paid out any checks for the crane or vehicles that were
purchased by the corporation after marriage. (R. 598, pg. 67)
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As a graphic example of the lack of business ownership and the parties
intent is when Mrs. Brough admittedly signed a corrective deed on property
owned by the business. In relation to land purchased by the business after the
marriage, Kathryn Brough acknowledged that she signed a corrective deed
changing the title on the "Ballard" property back to the corporation to reflect the
intent of the parties that the acquisition of that property was by Brough Trucking
& Crane Service, Inc. (Respondent's Exhibit 13)
Mr. Brough prior to trial assembled an accurate accounting of all of the
costs to build the Neola residence. Mrs. Brough did not contest this specific
accounting at trial.(R. 598 pg 174) At trial and on this appeal Richard Brough has
marshaled in detail the expenditures and the source of funds. Those funds were
always segregated in separate checking accounts in either the business or Mr.
Brough's personal accounts. The funds were used to pay all of the construction
costs and expenses of the residence. Mr. Brough testified that Kathy Brough was
never a signator on his personal checking account identified in the accounting set
forth in detail in Respondent's Exhibit 15. It is undisputed that the total
expenditures by his separate property exceed the value of the residence.
As to Kathryn Brough's contribution, she did contribute personal
assistance, time and effort in building the Neola Residence. This would be
relevant if there was enhanced value. She did not contribute any funds and she did
not prove at trial any monetary amounts contributed to the construction of the
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residence of any separate funds just as Mr. Brough had detailed. There was no
enhanced value over construction costs.
As set forth in Richard Brough's Exhibit 15(a), (b) and (c) and presented to
the court in proposed Findings, the costs paid by the business or Mr. Brough from
a personal fund to construct Neola residence are as follows:

I. Brough Trucking & Crane Service Inc.
ii. N. J. Trucking (checking account)
iii. Jim Brough, (personal checking account)
TOTAL

$166,373.89
$86,559.12
$73,318.10
$326,251.11

The premarital and separate property of Richard Brough was used to
construct the Neola residence. Further, the total costs and expenses contributed by
Mr. Brough from his premarital or separate funds exceed the present market value
of the Neola residence of $325,000.00 found by the Court.
In Utah, separate property and premarital assets should have been awarded
to the acquiring spouse if not awarded by enforcing the premarital agreement.
Olsen v. Olsen, 2007 UT App, 169 P.3d 765. In Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008
UT App, 176 P.3d 476, the Court stated:
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that when one party in a divorce
proceeding uses separate property to purchase a marital home, that party is
entitled to the equity in the home that resulted from his or her investment.

In Cox v. Cox, 1994 UT App, 877 P.2d 1262, the Court recognized equitable
factors relevant to equitable factors to these proceedings. The Court stated:
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Where the marriage is of short duration, where no children were born and
where the couple was married later in life, a trial court may properly
attempt to restore the parties to their premarital status. See, e.g., Georgedes
v. Georgedes, 627 P.2d 44, 45 (Utah 1981)
In Cox, the wife claimed the trial court erred in finding that appreciation on the
house was not due to her remodeling efforts. The Court affirmed the trial court in
its memorandum decision that determined that once the husband and wife's
expenditures were deducted from the $105,000.00 value of the house, the
residence had not materially appreciated and was not separate property.
Even though at trial, Kathryn Brough testified that the parties kept their
finances "separate", in the closing arguments at trial and in drafting the Findings
adopted by the trial court, her attorney claimed that there was co-mingling of
funds during the course of the marriage which is contrary to the objective
evidence. Mr. Brough traced all expenditures on the residence to his accounts.
Mrs. Brough indicated that after the marriage she received some separate
money as a property settlement from a prior divorce. She placed those funds in
her separate checking account and she paid personal expenses on her separate
credit cards from her personal account. This is the type of conduct expected in a
marriage late in life by two people previously divorced several times.
Further, the evidence that she kept hours, received W2 forms, received
corporate checks and deposited those checks into her separate checking account
proves the opposite of co-mingling of funds by the parties. Mr. Brough had sold
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business assets and the residence he owned prior to the marriage and placed them
in separate checking accounts to build the new Neola residence.
In relation to the evidence of limited landscaping and Mrs. Brough doing
some work on the Neola residence, see Johnson v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 329. In
Johnson the court stated:

Premarital property loses its separate identity and becomes a
part of the marital estate if "(1) the other spouse has by his or her
efforts or expense contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or
protection of that property, thereby acquiring an equitable interest in
it, or (2) the property has been consumed or its identity lost through
commingling or exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has made
a gift of an interest therein to the other spouse." Oliekan v. Oliekan,
2006 UT App 405,^20, 147 P.3d 464 (quoting Mortensen v.
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988)).
We are not persuaded by Husband's arguments that his purported
efforts—including doing some tile work in the home and
"supervising" landscaping and home theater installation-were
sufficient to obtain an equitable interest in the home. Instead, we
agree with the trial court that "[Wife] kept the asset separate" and
that the facts do not support a finding that "[Husband] made any
contribution to the house" other than possibly a monetary
contribution toward landscaping and tile—a portion of the one
deposit made into Wife's separate account—for which the court
ordered reimbursement to Husband.

Mrs. Brough as a non-owner did not prove the separate business
property lost its identity through co-mingling to become a joint property. Even if
the prenuptial agreement did not exist, the sole shareholder and owner, Mr.
Brough, owned the business corporation. The Petitioner's expert failed to identify
any enhanced value because there was no value found as of the date of marriage.
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The court changed from a value was $200,000.00 in his unsigned draft of Findings
to the speculative testimony set forth above on cross examination of Mr. Brough
of$44,000.00.
On the second issue of the Neola residence, Mr. Brough acknowledged
that Kathryn Brough's name was placed on the residence. However, the Court
should have determined which premarital property was used to construct the
residence and there was no enhanced value as proven by the objective undisputed
accounting. An award to her of one-half of the value had to totally disregard the
evidence of separate property traced into accounts of Mr. Brough from marital
assets to construct the Neola residence.
Therefore, the award of the one-half of the business and residence
should be reversed and the matter remanded for new trial on these issues.
POINT IV
KATHRYN BROUGH SHOULD BE ORDERED TO PAY AND
REIMBURSE THE COSTS OF HER EXPERT AND TO ASSUME HER
LEGAL FEES AND THE COURT FAILED TO MAKE ADEQUATE
FINDINGS ON THIS ISSUE.
From the commencement of this action, Richard Brough as the
Respondent was faced with an expensive appraisal process and for expert costs.
These costs totaled approximately over $12,700.00 for one expert and $1,500.00
for the equipment appraiser. (R. 598, pg. 137) He had to advance the costs to pay
the two experts to testify for the Petitioner about business property based upon a
pretrial order and has paid the balance due.
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These pretrial costs were incurred because Kathryn C. Brough choose
litigation in disregard of her signed agreement and claimed a substantial business
interest in the business. If the prenuptial agreement is enforced as to the business,
this total cost must be apportioned to the Petitioner as an unnecessary cost. On the
other hand even as a minimum, if she was awarded cash for the one-half of the
business she should have to pay at least one-half of the costs if the award is
upheld.
Further, in relation to coordinating the only business appraisal, Richard
Brough incurred $3,798.75 to Randall Gaither, Attorney at Law, for reasonable
attorney's fees and costs necessary to provide documents and to coordinate with
the two appraisers concerning the business appraisals retained by Kathryn Brough
by court order. (Respondent's Exhibit 28)
Richard J. Brough's business incurred $8,672.08 in expenses as set forth in
his Exhibit 8 that sets forth the expenses of Amanda Hansen and/or Kristy B.
Clayburn, employees of Brough Trucking and Crane Service Inc., in assembling
material and assisting in Court ordered appraisals of the business equipment.
(Addendum, pg. 167) This exhibit was received on the issue of allocation of
attorney's fees and costs. Both parties obtained appraisals for the property and
each should pay for their own appraisal. Mr. Brough was ordered to even pay her
costs for her the residential appraisal. These costs should have at least convinced
the judge to have the Petitioner bear some of the expensive costs from her
expected amount of over Three Hundred Thousand Dollars.
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At a minimum the costs should have distributed to Mrs. Brough because
she was later awarded in these proceedings a cash award of one-half of the
business less $44,000.00 or $224,000.00 from which she could at a minimum pay
one-half of the costs as a co-owner as the result of divorce litigation. The issue of
equitable apportionment of expert costs was an issue specifically raised by the
Respondent through the proceedings. (See Respondents Pre-trial Memorandum,
pg. 11, R. 303) (Post-trial Memorandum at Addendum, pg. 115 & 128) Counsel
never had a chance to object to any ruling or proposed lack of findings on this
issue except in the Motion for New trial where it was raised for a third time.
(Addendum, pg. 59) See Memorandum in support of the Motion for New trial or
to Amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (Addendum, pg. 67)
Further, as to both Attorneys fees as well as costs, the Court failed to
enter the required and adequate findings of the financial need of the receiving
spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the
requested fees. Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App, 176 P.3d 476. The only
findings entered indicate that the Petitioner has made some payments but does not
have the ability to pay the "additional fees" without the required balancing.
As to attorney's fees, Kathryn Brough testified that she had paid a Seven
Thousand Dollar retainer to her lawyer through the time of trial. (R. 598 pg 75)
Further, she was able to make monthly payments to her attorney for the three years
while this matter was pending on a promissory note. Her lawyer accepted those
payments and prepared for trial. She could clearly pay off any promissory note of
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legal fees from the substantial judgment or even the judgment for one-half of the
residence.
Common sense dictates that if she is given any kind of substantial award
she can afford to pay at least one-half of the costs. On cross-examination by
counsel for the Respondent, the Petitioner acknowledged that she had four or five
separate credit cards, each with at least a $1,000.00 limit and for which she was
able to maintain monthly payments and she could have used to make payments on
attorney's fees. (R. 598, pg. 105)
Richard Brough respectfully submits that in light of the award, the
factors require Mrs. Brough pay her own attorneys' fees as well as the costs of the
experts she retained in an attempt to prove a business interest. The trial court
should have taken this into account before saddling Mr. Brough with one hundred
percent of these costs and a substantial amount of attorney fees. The Affidavit for
attorney fees approved in ^f 12 of the Findings drafted by Attorney Allred and
reduced to judgment in Tj 7 of the Decree were set forth in Plaintiffs Exhibit 4,
Addendum, pg. 219) That amount of $15,391.63 does not deduct or amount for the
$7000.00 paid by Petitioner. This is a windfall not based on financial need.
The evidence presented by Mr. Brough that he was required to pay extra
business costs to employees, a loss of time to coordinate the appraisal, expend
employee expenses, incur additional accounting fees and substantial attorneys fees
to coordinate with the Petitioner's retained experts was ignored and Mrs. Brough
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received a benefit of over $30,000.00 in this matter. That amount is not supported
by the evidence, findings, or equity and should be reversed on appeal.

CONCLUSION

The court invited proposed Findings at the close of trial with no indication
of the unique procedure that was subsequently adopted. The trial court's "draft"
prepared after the trial demonstrates balancing of equitable interests. These
"though impressions" would not have been necessary if the Judge made it clear he
was going to allow one side tp write the ruling. This Court should not approve or
overlook the unfair procedure used in this matter to make a ruling on contested
issues. The Utah Constitution vests the judicial power in a trial court of general
jurisdiction and that power should not be delegated or abandoned to either attorney
in a trial proceeding. Parties should get a ruling from the Court, not opposing
counsel.
The general principal that should have guided the trial court in this divorce
was that the marriage was of short duration, no children were born and the couple
was married later in life. By applying the parties agreement, the trial court should
properly attempt to restore the parties to their premarital status where Mr. Brough
owned the trucking company he started decades earlier. This is especially true
where one party is an owner and the other an employee of the business
corporation. There was no basis to award the Petitioner one-half of the business
and no evidence of enhanced value form the petitioners expert that Mr. Brough
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had paid thousands of Dollars. The Neola house had no enhanced value over the
separate assets, which were used to construct the residence. The best evidence to
determine whether the division property is separate is the prenuptial contract
signed in contemplation of marriage before a notary by the parties.
The Appellant in the Motion for New Trial submitted to the trial judge that
it was inequitable and unfair to shift the costs of Mrs. Brough's expert witnesses
and her attorney fees to Richard J. Brough if Kathryn C. Brough was obtaining
over $300,000.00 as a result of the divorce proceedings. Upon each party
receiving "a substantial property distribution free and clear of debt", the court
should have determined that each party had cash and assets to allow for legal
representation.
Therefore, a new trial should be ordered to account the enforceable
prenuptial agreement. Under the evidence of her ability to pay before and after
trial it is only fair that Kathryn Brough should be pay the all of her costs and her
attorney fees.

DATED this

/

/

day of April 2009.

LLL'GAITHp/
Attorney for the Apper
Appellant
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